Europe and the Euro by Reint Gropp & Anil K Kashyap
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research
Volume Title: Europe and the Euro 
Volume Author/Editor: Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi, editors
Volume Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN:  0-226-01283-2
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ales08-1
Conference Dates: October 17-18, 2008
Publication Date: February 2010
Chapter Title:  A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe
Chapter Author:   Reint Gropp, Anil K Kashyap   
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11665
Chapter pages in book: (219- 246)219
6
A New Metric for Banking 
Integration in Europe
Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
6.1    Introduction
In this chapter we propose a new approach for assessing banking integra-
tion in Europe. The measurement of integration is of considerable policy 
relevance. For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) mission state-
ment reads: “We in the Eurosystem have as our primary objective the main-
tenance of price stability for the common good. Acting also as a leading 
ﬁ  nancial authority, we aim to safeguard ﬁ  nancial stability and promote Euro-
pean ﬁ  nancial integration” (italics added). The ECB (2009) deﬁ  nes ﬁ  nancial 
integration by saying “The market for a given set of ﬁ  nancial instruments or 
services to be fully integrated when all potential market participants in such 
a market (i) are subject to a single set of rules when they decide to deal with 
those ﬁ  nancial instruments or services, (ii) have equal access to this set of 
ﬁ  nancial instruments or services, and (iii) are treated equally when they oper-
ate in the market” (7).
This deﬁ  nition has direct implications for how banking integration should 
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be measured. For instance, the equal access condition presumes that it is 
proﬁ  table for all services to be oﬀered in all markets. This is akin to requir-
ing that if there is demand for a service it must be met everywhere within 
an economic area at the lowest cost at which it can be provided anywhere 
within that area. This seems a useful benchmark for bond or wholesale 
banking markets, but much less relevant for locally provided retail banking 
services. Unless bank cost structures are identical across local communities 
some services might not be oﬀered in some locations. This is not informative 
about ﬁ  nancial integration.
The equal treatment provision is also unusual because it includes no 
eﬃciency benchmark. As an extreme example, consider the case of a monop-
olist supplying ﬁ  nancial services far above marginal cost. This would satisfy 
the ECB deﬁ  nition, but clearly would not be eﬃcient, and we doubt it would 
be viewed as acceptable by policymakers.
The common problem highlighted by both these observations is that mar-
ket conditions depend on both supply and demand. The ECB deﬁ  nition 
pays insuﬃcient attention to the supply side of the market. Existing empiri-
cal work (as represented by Cabral, Dierck, and Vesala [2002]; Baele et al. 
[2004]; Adam et al. [2002]; ECB [2009]) also suﬀers to certain extent from 
the same criticism.
Previous research assessing integration has been of three varieties. One 
looks at the extent of cross-  border direct retail operations of banks (Gual 
[2004]; Perez, Salas-  Fumas, and Saurina [2005]). These data are tracked by 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and suggest that while whole-
sale or money market ﬂ  ows across borders within the euro area are large, 
retail ﬂ  ows are generally less than 1 percent of total lending. This is taken as 
evidence against retail banking integration, although most authors would 
concede that cross-  border retail ﬂ  ows do not constitute a necessary condi-
tion for retail banking integration to take place. One could easily imagine 
a ﬁ  nancial system in which we would observe a complete absence of cross-
  border retail ﬂ  ows, but which would be perfectly integrated. For example, 
the threat of such ﬂ  ows could be enough to ensure perfect integration.
A second indicator is cross- border bank mergers (see most recently Köhler 
[2007, 2009] for evidence on this and a review of this literature). The absence 
of such deals, say, in comparison to the number of domestic bank mergers, 
has also been taken as evidence against retail bank integration. Of course, 
similar arguments apply in this case, as cross-  border retail ﬂ  ows and cross-
  border mergers are likely to be neither necessary nor suﬃcient for ﬁ  nancial 
integration to take place.
The third method for detecting integration comes from the study of retail 
interest rates by Adam et al. (2002). They look at ﬁ  ve-  year corporate loans 
and mortgage loans and ﬁ  nd lending rates barely converge after 1999. In 
a partial adjustment model the speed of convergence is only 2 percent per A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 2 1
year for corporate rates and 7 percent for mortgage rates. Based on this slow 
rate of convergence, they conclude that retail banking markets are far from 
integrated and do not seem to be on a path toward integration.
The ECB’s annual ﬁ  nancial integration report (2009) reports extensive 
descriptive information, such as the cross-  country standard deviation of 
interest rates on various bank products to argue that retail bank markets are 
not integrated. Aﬃnito and Farabullini (2009) show that interest rate disper-
sion is reduced after controlling for variables reﬂ  ecting the characteristics 
of domestic borrowers, such as risk exposure, disposable income, ﬁ  rm size, 
and so forth. They also demonstrate that price dispersion is larger across 
the euro area than across regions in Italy. They conclude that “euro area 
prices appear diﬀerent because national banking products appear diﬀerent 
or because they are diﬀerentiated by national factors” (31– 32). We argue that 
this same reasoning implies that interest rate dispersion is a poor guide to 
judging integration. Indeed, we will present examples that show that interest 
rate dispersion may be completely unrelated to banking integration.
The starting point for our analysis is a reconsideration of the relevance 
of the law of one price in this context. We argue that the law of one price in 
retail banking, the way it has been applied in the previous literature, consti-
tutes neither a suﬃcient nor necessary condition for retail banking integra-
tion. The reason is the high degree of heterogeneity in demand for retail 
bank products that may arise from diﬀerences in tax systems, preferences, 
risk characteristics, or other demand- side related factors (section 6.2). Once 
we admit that there are legitimate reasons why demand might diﬀer across 
markets, then even with a single supply curve prices would diﬀer. Yet these 
price diﬀerences would not represent a failure of integration.
In section 6.3 we propose a new test of retail bank integration in the spirit 
of Stigler (1963), which we argue constitutes a suﬃcient condition for bank-
ing integration. Our notion of integration presumes new entry and takeovers 
will lead to a convergence in proﬁ  tability. This way of looking at integration 
shifts the focus to looking at barriers to entry and takeovers and to compari-
sons of proﬁ  t rates rather than prices of banking products. The remainder 
of the chapter explores whether integration in this sense holds.
In section 6.4 we describe the data we use to carry the test of our condi-
tion. This sample consists of 36,000 observations on banks in France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom between 1994 
and 2006. The sample includes listed and unlisted banks and also includes 
many savings and cooperative banks. We show that average proﬁ  tability 
varies widely among bank types (listed, unlisted) in Europe, but not in the 
United States. Further, even within listed and unlisted banks, proﬁ  tability 
varies widely across countries in Europe.
In section 6.5 we estimate a partial adjustment model to assess conver-
gence. The logic of our test suggests investigating whether proﬁ  t rates con-222        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
verge and whether the tendency toward convergence depends on the strength 
of the market for corporate control. Hence, publicly traded banks should 
be under diﬀerent pressure than unlisted banks.
We ﬁ nd this to be the case. Listed banks in Europe and the United States 
each show a tendency to revert to the average proﬁ  t rates in their respective 
areas. The nonlisted commercial banks in the United States that are unusu-
ally proﬁ  table tend to have these proﬁ  ts competed away—but underperform-
ing nontraded banks do not seem to improve. The proﬁ  t rates of the unlisted 
commercial banks in Europe show no tendency to converge to any type of 
European average; there is some evidence proﬁ  t rates for unlisted banks 
converge to a country- speciﬁ  c average. We read these patterns as suggesting 
the U.S. banking market is reasonably well- integrated, but that the banking 
market in Europe appears far from being integrated. We close this section 
with some thoughts on the relationship between the introduction of the 
common currency in the euro area and banking integration.
Section 6.6 oﬀers some ﬁ  nal thoughts on how the results might inform 
future policy discussions regarding ﬁ  nancial integration.
6.2      The Law of One Price Revisited
Intuitively, assessing integration using the law of one price seems appeal-
ing. Indeed, for many ﬁ  nancial instruments such as government bonds, or 
high grade corporate securities, checking for the convergence of prices is 
standard practice. In the case of bank products, however, heterogeneity that 
invariably is present will undermine this type of comparison. Banks oﬀer 
highly diﬀerentiated products to their customers, which may frequently be 
tailored toward their speciﬁ  c life circumstances, preferences, risk character-
istics, and needs. Unless one accurately controls for these diﬀerences, which 
may very likely systematically diﬀer across countries, the law of one price 
will not send a clear message regarding the state of integration.
We illustrate this point in two ways. Figure 6.1 shows our understanding 
of the standard view of ﬁ  nancial integration that underlies law of one price 
tests using generic supply and demand schedules. This characterization pre-
sumes that there is a single demand curve (which is common across markets 
and customers) and diﬀerent supply curves. The standard view presumes 
that if we observe more than one price for a similar product (as in the ﬁ  gure 
with P1, P2, and P3), then this is evidence for market segregation and a lack 
of integration. In the language of the ECB deﬁ  nition of integration, the 
equal treatment of customers across markets would not be satisﬁ  ed since 
identical customers are facing diﬀerent prices.
The logic behind the ECB deﬁ  nition would be that the common set of 
regulatory rules would lead supplier S1 to capture the market, because she 
or he is the low cost provider of the ﬁ  nancial service. So they should supply 
Q3 and the prevailing market price should be P3. Under these circumstances A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 2 3
the law of one price will give an accurate picture of the degree of ﬁ  nancial 
integration.
Now consider ﬁ  gure 6.2. Again, we would observe multiple prices (P1, P2, 
P3). But in ﬁ  gure 6.2, there is only one supply curve and the observed viola-
tion of the law of one price is due to unobserved heterogeneity in demand. 
The demand variation may be a function of diﬀerences in preferences, risk 
characteristics, or other demand characteristics in diﬀerent markets (coun-
tries). In this case, all of the conditions required under the ECB deﬁ  nition 
of integration might hold.
Thus, as a purely logical matter, tests for the law of one price implicitly 
assume that demand for bank’s products is homogeneous across markets 
and products.1 If there were suﬃcient harmonization across countries of 
all the factors that might lead to violations of the preconditions for capital 
structural irrelevance, then perhaps this assumption might be reasonable.2 
But we know statutory corporate tax rates diﬀer considerably, and eﬀective 
rates show even larger diﬀerences; for instance, Mintz (2006) reports that 
eﬀective average corporate tax rates in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain are 
32.1 percent, 38.1 percent, 30.2 percent, and 23.2 percent. So based purely on 
Fig. 6.1    Standard view of ﬁ  nancial integration
1. For an argument along similar lines, see Perez, Salas-  Fumas, and Saurina (2005).
2. One can summarize the necessary conditions for the Modigliani and Miller capital struc-
ture irrelevance as requiring that: (a) investors and ﬁ  rms can trade the same set of securities at 
competitive market prices equal to the present value of their future cash ﬂ  ows; (b) there are no 
taxes, transactions costs, or issuance costs associated with security trading; (c) a ﬁ  rm’s ﬁ  nanc-
ing decisions do not change the cash ﬂ  ows generated by its investments, nor do they reveal new 
information about them. See Berk and DeMarzo (2007, chapter 14) for further details.224        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
diﬀerences in the tax advantages of interest deductibility, the preference for 
debt versus equity ﬁ  nancing should diﬀer in these countries. Consequently, 
there is no reason to expect demand for bank loans to be equalized and, 
hence, prices on bank loans to converge.
On top of the tax issues, the large literature on diﬀerences on the ef-
fectiveness in corporate governance across countries imply potentially dif-
ferential beneﬁ  ts of debt ﬁ  nancing to control agency costs. These consider-
ations would generate further variation in the demand for debt, and likely 
the monitoring provided by banks.
Once demand diﬀerences are acknowledged, deciding how to describe the 
state of market integration becomes much more diﬃcult. The well-  known 
literature on price discrimination following from Varian (1985) suggests 
that prices would likely diﬀer in the presence of cross-  market diﬀerences in 
demand. This may or may not entail any eﬃciency or welfare costs.
One way to see the subtleties involved is to suppose that the ultimate source 
demand diﬀerences can be traced to variation in the costs that diﬀerent cus-
tomers face in searching for credit. This seems like a plausible benchmark 
in the context of many retail bank products. In this case, the large body of 
research dating back to Salop and Stiglitz (1982) becomes relevant. These 
models of spatial competition describe conditions under which price disper-
sion for identical goods can arise in equilibrium. In this case, even within 
countries prices would not converge. Note that in this class of models, ﬁ  nan-
cial service ﬁ  rms would enter the market and drive proﬁ  t rates down to the 
Fig. 6.2    Alternative view of ﬁ  nancial integrationA New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 2 5
level of the entry cost. In this case there would be no ineﬃciencies in the 
market, despite the price dispersion.
For all these reasons, it seems to us the conditions needed to construct 
an informative test for integration based on the law of one price are very 
unlikely to prevail. Hence, we look for a diﬀerent type of test.
6.3      Return on Assets as a Measure of Bank Integration
Stigler (1963) kicked oﬀ a large literature in industrial organization based 
on the observation that in equilibrium (with well-  functioning markets) the 
expected returns of comparable assets in an economy should be similar. 
Stigler’s empirical work (and all of the subsequent work we have found, such 
as Fama and French [2000]), has been conducted using nonﬁ  nancial busi-
nesses. We explore whether the returns on assets of banks across diﬀerent 
markets/  countries converge and suggest that convergence of proﬁ  tability is 
a preferable measure of ﬁ  nancial integration to the law of one price.
Convergence would only be expected if the structure of the retail banking 
industry is such that (a) product markets are contestable and (b) the market 
for corporate control operates eﬃciently across markets.3 While neither of 
these conditions has received much attention in the discussion over retail 
banking integration, they seem to be essential preconditions for an integrated 
equilibrium. More speciﬁ  cally, if these two conditions hold, the implica-
tions for the return on assets of banks in diﬀerent countries are straightfor-
ward. If a bank earns rents in a market, the threat of a new entrant should 
drive down these rents toward the equilibrium value. If a bank underper-
forms in a market, a more eﬃcient competitor should take this bank over, 
driving returns on assets up toward the equilibrium value.
We should emphasize that contestability and a functioning market for cor-
porate control are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for ﬁ  nancial integra-
tion to take place. For example, consider the hypothetical monopoly supplier 
that we argued earlier might satisfy the ECB deﬁ  nition of integration. If 
this monopolist were faced with a threat of takeover (possibly from outside 
the euro area) and the market was contestable, then the banking services 
would be provided eﬃciently at marginal cost. Proﬁ  ts would converge and 
we would identify the market as integrated. Conversely, if there was not any 
takeover pressure, or if the market could not be captured by a competitor, 
then prices might diﬀer across locations and/  or be priced above marginal 
cost. In this case, proﬁ  ts need not converge and we would judge the markets 
not to be integrated.
Likewise, the models predicated on the Salop and Stiglitz depiction of 
3. We presume throughout the analysis that all banks can be meaningfully compared. 
Banks specialize so as to ﬁ  ll very diﬀerent niches, then the Stigler reasoning breaks down since 
eﬀectively the banks would not be competing. Hence, we do not control for risk or make any 
other adjustments to reﬂ  ect diﬀerences in operating practices or strategies.226        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
spatial competition also posit entry as an equilibrating mechanism. In that 
framework, banks choose where to locate by spreading out so that the proﬁ  ts 
are competed down to just cover entry costs. Given homogeneity of regula-
tions across the euro area this would also lead to convergence in proﬁ  ts.
Empirically, we look for convergence in the return on assets (ROA) of 
banks by estimating variants of the classic partial adjustment equation.4 
Under rational expectations we can use realized ex post values as a proxy 
for expected returns (e.g., Cochrane 2001) and start with a speciﬁ  cation of 
the form
(1)  ROAit    (ROAt ∗  ROAit1)  ui  vit.
In what follows, we consider several models of the long-  run equilibrium 
proﬁ  tability, ROA∗. The actual estimating equation is the diﬀerenced form 
of (1):5
(2)  ROAit    ROAt ∗  	ROAit1  wit.
In principle, the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable, 	, should equal 
1 –   . But as emphasized by Caballero and Engel (2004), the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimate of 	 is biased toward zero if changes in proﬁ  tability 
are lumpy. The intuition for this econometric problem is easiest to see under 
the extreme case when changes in ROA are always discrete and ROA∗ is a 
random walk. In this case, the OLS estimate of 	 can be deduced by consid-
ering four possible terms based on whether the ROA adjusted either at t –   1 
or t. In three of these cases, there was no adjustment in either or both peri-
ods, so that the covariance between the change ROA at time t and t –   1 will 
necessarily be zero. The only time when a correlation is possible is when there 
is adjustment in consecutive periods. Because the t –   1 adjustment would 
optimally put ROA at its equilibrium value, there would be no way to predict 
whether the subsequent shocks would involve upward or downward adjust-
ment. So, on average, these two changes will be uncorrelated as well.6
Our theory implies that the adjustment mechanism is likely to involve dis-
crete entry and exit decisions, so we would expect the change in proﬁ  tability 
to exhibit considerable kurtosis. We show later that this is indeed the case, 
4. An alternative to using banks’ proﬁ  tability would be to check for convergence in banks’ 
proﬁ  t or cost eﬃciency. For a survey of this literature see Hughes and Mester (2008). Below we 
present results for one alternative measure of bank proﬁ  tability (ROE).
5. This speciﬁ  cation is derived by taking lags of both sides of the equation and taking the 
diﬀerence. The constant term would be zero but as explained in the next footnote, for certain 
speciﬁ  cations we consider samples where the mean adjustment is nonzero by construction. So 
we include the constant in all speciﬁ  cations to permit comparisons across speciﬁ  cations.
6. There may be a second problem with estimating equation (2) with OLS; the lagged depen-
dent variable on the right-  hand side may be correlated with the error term (Nickell 1981). 
We discuss some instrumental variables estimates that potentially attend to this concern fol-
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hence we will infer the adjustment speed from the change in the estimated 
target for proﬁ  tability and make no attempt to impose a restriction linking 
the coeﬃcients on ROA∗ and the lagged dependent variable.
This reasoning suggests the following (strong) deﬁ  nition of convergence.
Strong deﬁ  nition of integration: The world banking market is integrated 
if there is a common ROA∗ to which all banks converge.
There are many reasons (including regulatory) that banks in the United 
States and Europe might ﬁ  nd it diﬃcult to use the same business model in 
each location. If that is true then pressure from banks on the diﬀerent con-
tinents driving convergence may be weak.
Hence, we also consider weaker deﬁ  nitions of integration. Our second 
deﬁ  nition requires that all banks in the European Union (EU) converge to 
the same equilibrium value of ROA. Hence:
Weak deﬁ  nition of integration: The EU banking market is integrated if 
there is a common ROA∗ to which all EU banks converge.
To clarify the interpretation of the results for integration in the EU, we 
also study the behavior of U.S. banks. We do this because the U.S. bank-
ing market is generally considered to be integrated and (relatively) eﬃcient 
(although we do test this presumption). Accordingly, we compare both the 
equilibrium value ROA and the estimated speed of convergence for both 
U.S. and European banks. We view the U.S. results as providing both a 
check of our procedure and a quantitative benchmark for the European 
estimates.
One useful feature of our framework is that it naturally suggests culprits 
that might be responsible if integration is absent. In particular, besides just 
estimating equation (2) for all banks, it is informative to check whether the 
underperforming banks raise their proﬁ  tability or whether highly proﬁ  table 
banks see declines in proﬁ  ts.7 If underperforming banks raise their proﬁ  t-
ability, we would interpret this as evidence in favor of a functioning market 
for corporate control, forcing them to improve their performance.8 If highly 
proﬁ  table banks see their proﬁ  ts decline quickly, this would be evidence for 
contestability in banking markets, in which the threat of entry or actual 
entry quickly eliminates rents.
These possibilities suggest that it would be useful to conduct the tests con-
trolling for diﬀerences in contestability or the eﬀectiveness of corporate gov-
ernance. This leads us to estimate ROA convergence separately for diﬀerent 
7. We allow the constant in equation (2) for precisely this reason. When estimated on a sample 
of banks whose ROA is either above or below ROA∗ it would make no sense to omit the con-
stant. So to permit comparisons in the full sample estimates, we also allow an intercept.
8. Given that we are estimating continuous, albeit lumpy, adjustment, we think of the main 
mechanism as the threat of takeover more than a potential takeover itself.228        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
types of banks. Both contestability and the market for corporate control 
should be fully operational for listed banks, while the threat of a takeover 
may be considerably weaker for an unlisted bank. Hence, for unlisted banks 
we would expect much slower ROA convergence from below. We would 
expect adjustment due to contestability to be similar for unlisted and listed 
banks; if we ﬁ  nd diﬀerences here, this would be strong evidence of lack of 
integration.
Finally, the tests will be conducted deﬂ  ating proﬁ  ts by the book value 
of assets (rather than the market value). There are several reasons for this 
choice. The structure of the European banking sector is one of them. As 
we show later, the number of listed banks for which we could conceivably 
calculate market values is low in Europe. By limiting our analysis to these 
banks we would miss an important share of the European retail banking 
sector, especially in Germany, where both savings and cooperative banks 
are important. Indeed, the diﬀerences between listed and unlisted banks 
are themselves informative so that ignoring the nontraded banks would 
reduce the power of our tests. Moreover, as a practical matter, proper mea-
surement of the market values of banks’ assets would require market values 
of the loan portfolios of banks, which are unavailable. Lastly, the eﬃciency 
of stock market valuations would force rates of return measured at market 
prices to converge, irrespective of the degree of integration. The point of 
our procedure is to see operating performance (i.e., the cash ﬂ  ows produced 
by the banks for a given book value of assets) convergences, not whether 
the stock market functions properly. Hence, our measure is only informative 
about integration when the analysis is done using book values.
6.4    Data
We conﬁ  ne the study to banks in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom, and include U.S. banks as a benchmark. We start with 
all consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheet data for banks in these 
countries that are available in the Bankscope database. We ﬁ  rst eliminate all 
banks that are part of the consolidated balance sheet of another bank. We 
track banks from 1994 to 2006. We also eliminate banks with zero or nega-
tive total assets, missing post- tax proﬁ  ts, total customer loans, total deposits, 
interest earnings, and operating expenses. We drop banks that had fewer 
than four observations and observations in the bottom or top 2 percent of 
the change in ROA.
The resulting distribution of bank/  year observations is given in table 6.1. 
About two- thirds of the observations are from EU countries, with Germany 
accounting for 46 percent of the sample and the United States accounting 
for just under one-  third.
Data on the type of banks are reported in table 6.2. Roughly 40 percent A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 2 9
of the sample consists of commercial banks or bank holding companies; 
below, we group these banks along with the handful of medium-  and long-
  term credit banks and real estate banks into the “commercial bank” cat-
egory. Of the commercial banks, 60 percent are U.S. institutions.
The banks not counted as commercial are savings or cooperative banks. 
The location of the savings and cooperative banks across countries is also 
very uneven. Almost all cooperative banks are either located in Germany 
(8,813 bank/  year observations) and Italy (1,980) bank/  year observations) 
and are extremely small. Savings banks are predominantly located in Ger-
many (5,981 bank/ year observations) and the United States (2,414 bank/ year 
observations).
In table 6.3, we present sample statistics for the level and change of ROA. 
We compute return on assets as the ratio of post- tax proﬁ  ts divided by total 
assets. The mean return on assets is 0.62 percent, which is somewhat lower 
than the average value of ROA of 0.8 percent obtained in a very large cross-
 national sample in Demirguc- Kunt and Huizinga (1998). The distribution is 
skewed to the right with a median of 0.45 percent. As one would expect, the 
mean and the median of the ﬁ  rst diﬀerence of ROA are zero or very close 
to zero. Importantly, the kurtosis of the change in ROA is 8.12, which sug-
gests that the lumpiness concerns discussed by Caballero and Engel (2004) 
are quite relevant.
Table 6.1  Sample country composition
  Country   Number of banks  Percent 
Germany (DE) 17,013 46.61
Spain (ES) 764 2.09
France (FR) 2,720 7.45
Italy (IT) 2,686 7.36
United Kingdom (UK) 1,378 3.78
United States (U.S.) 11,940 32.71
  All   36,501   100.00  
Table 6.2  Sample bank type composition
  Bank type   Number of banks  Percent 
Commercial bank 15,645 42.9
Savings bank 9,271 25.4
Cooperative bank 11,585 31.7
  Total   36,501   100.00  
Notes: Bank type is determined based on Bankscope variable “Specialisation (General).” 
“Commercial bank” include banks classiﬁ  ed by Bankscope as bank holding companies, 
medium-   and long-  term credit banks, and mortgage banks.230        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
When estimating equation (2) we must construct an estimate of ROA∗. 
The essence of the Caballero and Engel bias argument is that ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c 
proxies for the target level of proﬁ  tability will still be plagued by the eﬀects 
of infrequent adjustment.9 Fortunately, aggregate variables can be used to 
construct a target measure and in our application, the mean rate of proﬁ  t-
ability is a natural candidate target. So we will consider various mean rates 
of proﬁ  t as the equilibrium target.
Figure 6.3 shows the mean rate of returns for all banks in the sample. It 
is quite clear that there are substantial diﬀerences in proﬁ  t rates across the 
counties in our sample. The U.S. proﬁ  t rates are consistently higher than 
elsewhere and German rates are consistently lower, and until the last couple 
of years of the sample the gap between the two does not narrow. Given the 
diﬀerent governance mechanisms and proﬁ  t objectives across banks and 
the diﬀerent percentages of bank types across countries, we do not view these 
diﬀerences as particularly informative.
Figure 6.4 breaks out the banks into categories that we ﬁ  nd more mean-
ingful. The upper panel shows the ROAs for the publicly traded banks; 
there are 699 banks, with three-  quarters U.S.-  based. These banks presum-
ably have a strong proﬁ  t motive and are potentially taken over if they are 
poor performers, so that both the necessary preconditions for our test hold 
for these institutions. The proﬁ  t rate distribution, especially in the early 
part of the sample, is quite dispersed. As in ﬁ  gure 6.3, the U.S. banks show 
9. Fama and French (2000) build a ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c target and use the dividend payout rate, a 
dummy for dividend paying ﬁ  rms and the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value 
of equity. Even if we were to ignore the lumpiness issues, these variables would not work well in 
our context. For example, we have many nonlisted ﬁ  rms so we cannot use the market-  to-  book 
ratio. We did not have complete data on dividend payments available either. Virtually all large 
listed banks pay dividends and for the unlisted ones the data are not available. It is not clear 
for the cooperative banks whether dividend payments should be thought of in the usual sense 
(because the banks can pass proﬁ  ts back to their members in other ways, such as through lower 
fees). Further, we are interested in whether banks converge to a common target, rather than a 
ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c target.
Table 6.3  Descriptive statistics
    Mean   Median  
Standard 
deviation   Kurtosis  
Number of 
observations
Return on assets 0.0062 0.0045 0.0058 6.89 36,501
Change in return on assets 0.00003 0 0.0027 8.12 36,501
Return on equity 0.084 0.072 0.059 4.19 36,501
Change in return on equity  –0.0005   –0.0006  0.049   21.18   36,501
Notes: Return on assets is Pre-  Tax Proﬁ  ts (Bankscope variable I28) divided by Total Assets 
(Bankscope variable A61). Return on equity is Pre-  Tax Proﬁ  ts (Bankscope variable I28) di-
vided by Total Equity (Bankscope variable L42).A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 3 1
Fig. 6.3    Average ROA for all banks
persistently higher proﬁ  ts than the others. Given the high percentage of 
U.S. banks in the sample, this makes the mean rate for all the listed banks 
higher in every year than the average for each of the European countries. As 
a second point of reference, the heavy line in the ﬁ  gure shows the average for 
the European countries only. By the last few years of the sample the average 
proﬁ  t rates narrowed. For example, in 1996 the range of average proﬁ  t rates 
across countries was 91 basis points, and by 2006 the range had shrunk to 
54 basis points.
The second panel shows commercial banks that are not publicly traded. 
These banks are supposed to maximize proﬁ  ts but if they are not doing 
so it may be costly to acquire control to correct any underperformance. 
Again, the U.S. banks are noticeably and consistently more proﬁ  table than 
their European counterparts. As a reference, we include the average proﬁ  t 
rate for the listed European banks. While the mean for the listed banks is 
in the middle of the distribution from 2000 onwards, the distribution of 
proﬁ  t rates (if anything) is widening slightly over the last six years. While 
in 1999 the diﬀerence in average proﬁ  t rates of the unlisted European 
banks was 26 basis points, by the end of the sample the spread was 43 basis 
points.
The last panel shows the proﬁ  t rates for savings and cooperative banks. 
A priori, these banks satisfy neither of our necessary conditions for proﬁ  t 
convergence—there are so few of these banks in the United Kingdom that 
we omit their average from the picture. Recall that most of the banks in the 
sample are in Germany and the United States and through 2003 the move-
ments in the proﬁ  t rates in these countries appear to be completely discon-
nected, before converging somewhat in the last years of the sample. The 
ROA in the other three countries also narrowed substantially at the end of 
the sample, but the averages over the prior years were very diﬀerent.Fig. 6.4    Average ROA listed banks; average ROA for unlisted commercial banks; 
average ROA for savings and cooperative banksA New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 3 3
6.5    Convergence  Estimates
6.5.1    Baseline
We turn now to more formal econometric tests to assess convergence 
based on estimating equation (2) for the three groups of banks in ﬁ  gure 
6.4. Because the preconditions involving contestability and corporate con-
trol most naturally hold for the listed banks, we begin by estimating the 
equation for them. The ﬁ  rst column in table 6.4 shows that listed banks 
proﬁ  t rates move toward the average for all banks in the sample, closing 
half the gap between their own level of proﬁ  ts and the target each year.10 
Fama and French, in their investigation of nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, estimated the 
speed of convergence (to a ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c mean) to be roughly 0.4. The lagged 
dependent variable has a signiﬁ  cant negative coeﬃcient, which based on 
the reasoning on Caballero and Engel is not surprising.11 Consequently, in 
what follows we ignore the coeﬃcient estimate on the lagged dependent vari-
able and concentrate instead on the implied estimate for  from the ROA∗ 
proxy.
Based on ﬁ  gure 6.4, we know that the average proﬁ  t rate for the full sample 
is driven by developments in the United States. Moreover, ﬁ  gure 6.4 also tells 
us that the average in rate in each of the European countries lies below the 
sample average in each year. So based on these considerations there are good 
reasons to doubt the robustness of this initial speciﬁ  cation. In the second 
speciﬁ  cation in table 6.4, we drop the U.S. banks and reestimate the equa-
tion. This regression conﬁ  rms the hunch that the European banks are not 
tracking the overall sample average proﬁ  t rate. The estimated value for  is 
negative and insigniﬁ  cant from zero. Hence, the apparent convergence from 
the ﬁ  rst speciﬁ  cation is entirely due to the U.S. banks and there is no evidence 
that European banks are mirroring their U.S. counterparts. Therefore, the 
strongest version of integration fails.
The next two speciﬁ  cations in table 6.4 explore weaker tests of conver-
gence, asking whether the U.S. banks’ proﬁ  ts move with the average in the 
United States and whether the European rates move with the European 
average. Both of these tendencies are present. The U.S. banks’ convergence 
is, if anything, implausibly high, with  estimated to be 0.85. Taken literally, 
this implies that virtually all proﬁ  t diﬀerences are eliminated within one year. 
We suspect that some of this comes from the fact that our sample includes 
10. The standard errors are clustered at the bank level throughout our analysis. If instead 
we cluster by date the standard errors for U.S. samples fall and those for the EU samples tend 
to rise somewhat.
11. The intuition is as follows. If the adjustment involves discrete actions and the ROA∗ has 
a trend, then the periods of inaction will cause the typical change in the actual ROA to be less 
than the trend. Consequently, the longer the period in between the adjustments, the larger will 
be the observed action to catch up. Without making speciﬁ  c assumptions on the stochastic 
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a period of substantial consolidation in the U.S. banking market, when 
the largest listed banks took over many of the middle-  sized banks that had 
been prominent prior to the possibility nationwide branching—see Jones 
and Critchﬁ  eld (2005) for a survey of overall consolidation trends in the 
United States.
For the European publicly traded banks, we ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant convergence 
toward the mean rate for Europe. The estimated value of , 0.33, is plausible 
and signiﬁ  cantly lower than the U.S. estimate.12 Thus, European listed banks 
do appear to be operating in an integrated market.
Nonlisted banks have prominent market shares in both the United States 
and Europe. In this sample, the percentage of European bank assets residing 
in listed banks is 53 percent, while the analogous percentage in the United 
States is 47 percent in 2006. Therefore, the ﬁ  nding of convergence for listed 
banks in the EU and United States is not a suﬃcient statistic for the overall 
state of market integration. So we next ask whether the nontraded banks are 
also moving toward the average proﬁ  t rates for the listed banks.
For the United States the answer is yes. The nonlisted commercial banks 
show a signiﬁ  cant propensity to move toward the average rate of proﬁ  t for 
their listed competitors. The estimate for  is .431, which is signiﬁ  cantly 
below the rate for listed banks. A lower speed of convergence for unlisted 
banks is not surprising. We expect that in markets where high proﬁ  ts are 
being earned, competition among unlisted banks and from listed banks 
would compete down any rents. But, in cases where an unlisted bank is 
underperforming, taking it over may be much more costly than taking 
over a poor performing listed bank. This second consideration would lead 
to a lower average speed of convergence. We explore this conjecture in the 
next section.13
The European results for unlisted banks are strikingly diﬀerent from the 
United States. The estimate of  for unlisted commercial banks is – 0.014 and 
insigniﬁ  cantly diﬀerent from zero. The corresponding coeﬃcient for savings 
and cooperative banks is –  0.06 and signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level. Hence, 
there is no indication that the proﬁ  t rates of unlisted banks in Europe are 
tied to proﬁ  t patterns for listed banks. Hence, even our weak deﬁ  nition of 
integration fails for unlisted and noncommercial banks in the EU.
12. Not surprisingly, the U.S.-  listed banks are not converging to the average proﬁ  t rate of 
the European banks, nor are the European banks moving toward the average proﬁ  t rate for 
the U.S. banks.
13. For completeness, the table also includes information on savings and cooperative banks. 
Remarkably the proﬁ  ts of savings banks in the United States also tend to converge to the rates 
of listed banks. The coeﬃcient for  is 1.15. We ﬁ  nd this result surprising and puzzling for 
at least two reasons. One is that there is abundant evidence that savings banks have a funda-
mentally diﬀerent business model than commercial banks, especially large commercial banks 
(Critchﬁ  eld et al. 2004). The conventional view is that in the U.S. community banks hardly com-
pete with large commercial banks. Moreover, it is often very diﬃcult to take over community 
banks. Hence, it is not clear what mechanism would force convergence for these banks.236        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
6.5.2    Further  Tests
We next explore whether the mechanisms suggested by our theory appear 
operative. In particular, we ask whether banks whose proﬁ  ts are above ROA∗ 
fall (due to competition) and whether banks with below target proﬁ  ts 
improve (due to a threat of a takeover). We view these predictions as asym-
metric because competition should always be a force to dissipate rents, but 
taking over or restructuring an underperforming bank is costly. So if corpo-
rate governance changes are associated with a high ﬁ  xed cost, they may be 
diﬃcult to implement. This is true even for listed banks, as many of the gains 
of a takeover frequently accrue to the shareholders of the existing ﬁ  rm (e.g., 
Shleifer and Vishny 1988). Furthermore, cooperative banks may not even 
have a proﬁ  t maximization motive, so if they were recording low proﬁ  ts they 
might have little incentive and no outside pressure to improve. Accordingly, 
in these tests we study only commercial banks (listed and unlisted) where 
there is no ambiguity about the management objectives.14
We reﬁ ne the basic predictions about the eﬀects of contestability and cor-
porate governance in two ways. First, we expect all commercial banks (listed 
or not) to be subject to competitive pressure. Thus, we expect abnormal 
proﬁ  ts to be competed away for all commercial banks. Second, we expect 
an asymmetry in the eﬀect of corporate governance, with listed banks being 
easier to restructure than unlisted banks.
The ﬁ  rst two speciﬁ  cations in table 6.5 show the estimates of  for listed 
U.S. banks that are below and above ROA∗. In both cases,  is signiﬁ  cantly 
positive, although the estimate for the underperforming banks is implausibly 
large. The estimates suggest that competitive forces and corporate gover-
nance are both operating for these banks.
The next two columns show the analogous estimates for the EU-  listed 
banks. Both the estimates are close to 0.3, and thus eﬀectively the same as 
the estimate from table 6.4 where the speed of adjustment was restricted to 
be the same in both directions. The standard errors are now much larger, so 
we cannot be conﬁ  dent that the estimates are diﬀerent from zero. Hence, the 
evidence for contestability and the market for corporate control operating 
with respect to the EU mean is relatively weak. One potential explanation 
is that this is a sample size problem: we have data for only about 100 listed 
banks (and 600 observations) in the EU, as opposed to more than 400 banks 
(and more than 2,000 observations) in the United States. This accurately re-
ﬂ  ects the limited number of listed banks in the EU, so there is nothing that 
we can do about this shortage of data.15
14. We are ignoring agency problems and corporate governance issues here.
15. It is important to distinguish between the number of listed banks and their market 
share. In the United States there are hundreds of listed banks. In some European countries, 
most notably Spain and the United Kingdom, there are a relatively small number of listed 
banks operating, but their market share exceeds the market share of listed banks in the United A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 3 7
The next pair of estimates shows the results for unlisted U.S. commercial 
banks. The underperforming banks do not seem to raise their proﬁ  ts. Hence, 
the pressure on poorly performing unlisted banks to improve performance 
through the market for corporate control is weaker for unlisted than for 
listed commercial banks. In contrast, high proﬁ  t unlisted banks do tend to 
see their rents competed down (and the estimate is signiﬁ  cant at the 1 per-
cent level). This pattern is consistent with the view that competitive forces 
are operative for these banks even if there are impediments to a functioning 
market for corporate control.
The ﬁ  nal estimates in the table show the results for unlisted EU commer-
cial banks. The estimate for the underperforming banks is insigniﬁ  cantly 
diﬀerent from zero, suggesting that they face no pressure to raise proﬁ  ts. 
The point estimate for the relatively high proﬁ  t banks is negative (i.e., they 
tend to move away from the equilibrium value) but insigniﬁ  cantly diﬀerent 
from zero, implying that competition pressure is also absent. The failure 
of underperforming banks to improve is not surprising, but the absence of 
competitive pressures among unlisted commercial banks is noteworthy. To 
explore this further we examined whether either ﬁ  nding was due to banks 
in one individual country. This does not appear to be the case, so we do not 
report the results; we obtain the same results as shown for the unlisted Euro-
pean banks when we reestimate the regressions omitting each country.
As a ﬁ  nal assessment of the unlisted European banks, we reestimate equa-
tion (2) using the within- country mean ROA for unlisted commercial banks 
as ROA∗. The results are reported in table 6.6. The ﬁ  rst column shows that 
proﬁ  ts do converge to these country- speciﬁ  c targets proﬁ  t rates. The estimate 
for  is 0.258 and hence is close to the estimate for listed banks (from table 
6.3). The next two columns show that both underperforming and high proﬁ  t 
banks also converge, although the estimate for the high proﬁ  t banks is only 
marginally signiﬁ  cant.16
When we repeat this test for listed banks we ﬁ  nd no convergence; that is, 
the proﬁ  ts of listed banks in each country do not converge to the average 
proﬁ  ts of the unlisted banks in that country.17 Hence, there appears to be 
incomplete integration between listed banks on the one hand and unlisted 
banks on the other. Put diﬀerently, we do not ﬁ  nd any proxy for target 
States. This points to another potential reason for the weaker estimated convergence among 
European banks: if these mega-  banks are so large that no domestic institutions can acquire 
them, then the only potential buyers might be outside the country. If so, the ﬁ  xed costs involve 
in turning these banks around will be higher for the relevant suitors and the pressure to reform 
may be weaker.
16. If we repeat this exercise for the cooperative and savings banks in Europe, their ROAs 
also converge to the within-  country mean ROA of cooperative and savings banks. As in the 
case of the U.S. savings and cooperative banks, the estimated coeﬃcients for these regressions 
seem implausibly large.
17. To save space we do not show the results, but the point estimate for  that is analogous to 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 3 9
 proﬁ  tability that governed both the listed and unlisted European banks, 
even within countries.
The overall picture that emerges is one of limited bank integration 
throughout Europe and of incomplete bank integration even within coun-
tries in Europe. For the relatively few banks whose shares are publicly traded, 
proﬁ  t rates do tend to move in tandem and converge to the EU average rate. 
But the vast majority of banks are not listed. These banks’ proﬁ  ts do not 
tend to move in step with the listed banks and instead tend to converge only 
to a country-  speciﬁ  c target.
It may be tempting to argue that these results are attributable to the very 
simple econometric speciﬁ  cation that we have used. That the same speciﬁ  -
cations deliver a very diﬀerent set of results in the United States suggests 
otherwise.18 In the United States the listed banks’ proﬁ  ts converge to the 
Table 6.6  Country-  speciﬁ  c mean reversion for unlisted European commercial banks
Unlisted commercial banks
Proxy for ROA∗  
Country- speciﬁ  c 
unlisted mean  
Country- speciﬁ  c 
unlisted mean  
Country- speciﬁ  c 
unlisted mean
Region EU EU EU
Adjustment from above from below
ROA∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.281∗ 0.184∗∗
(0.077) (0.154) (0.081)
ROAt–1 –0.156∗∗∗ –0.140∗∗∗ –0.117∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.03) (0.031)
Constant 0.000 –0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.00008) (0.00005)
R2 0.027 0.0217 0.016
N 5,237 2,001 3,236
Number of banks   721   494   603
Notes: Ordinary least squares estimates of equation (2) in the text. Standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at the bank level in parentheses. Sample is taken from Bankscope as described 
in the text. The dependent variable is ROAt of bank i; ROAt–1 is the dependent variable 
lagged by one period; ROA∗ represents the ﬁ  rst diﬀerence of the mean of ROA of the re-
gional subsample for diﬀerent groups of banks as indicated in the table; ROA∗ represents 
the ﬁ  rst diﬀerence of the country-  speciﬁ  c mean of ROA for unlisted banks as indicated in the 
table. “Adjustment from below” and “Adjustment from above” in columns (3) and (4) refers to 
sample splits according to whether ROA of bank i was below or above the respective sample 
mean ROA∗ during period t. Unlisted commercial banks are identiﬁ  ed using Bankscope vari-
able “Listed Institution” and “Specialisation (General)”
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
18. We also doubt that the diﬀerence in the U.S. and EU results are attributable to other 
econometric problems. For instance, we know that the coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent vari-
able in regressions of the form as in equation (2) is biased. Phillips and Sul (2003) show that the 240        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
average level (although at a much faster rate than in Europe). Likewise, the 
high proﬁ  t unlisted banks also see their proﬁ  ts competed away and they 
converge to the same proﬁ  t rate as for listed banks. This suggests to us that 
there is nothing mechanical about our procedure that precludes ﬁ  nding inte-
gration in a market.
We use ROA as our baseline measure because given diﬀerences in taxes 
alluded to previously, bank leverage ratios could diﬀer, and hence expected 
returns on equity could diﬀer.19 As a robustness check, however, we also 
reestimated the model using return on equity (ROE) rather than the ROA 
as our proﬁ  t measure.
Table 6.7 shows the results for the most noteworthy speciﬁ  cations reported 
in tables 6.5 and 6.6 with ROEt as the dependent variable and ROE∗ in 
place of ROA∗. As before, we ﬁ  nd convergence for listed banks in both the 
United States and the European Union and convergence of unlisted banks 
to the listed ROE∗ only in the United States. Unlisted banks in Europe do 
not show any convergence toward the equilibrium ROE. The diﬀerence to 
the results with ROA are mainly in the speed of adjustment of listed banks 
in the EU, which is now of comparable magnitude to that of listed banks in 
the United States. We also conﬁ  rm the ﬁ  nding that underperforming listed 
banks adjust up and high proﬁ  t listed banks adjust down in the United 
States and the EU. For unlisted banks, high proﬁ  ts are competed away in 
the United States, but underperforming unlisted banks continue to do so. 
Neither mechanism seems to be operable for unlisted banks in the EU. All 
of this is consistent with the results for ROA in tables 6.5 and 6.6.
6.5.3      The Role of the Euro
Unfortunately, because we are forced to rely on changes in ROA∗ to esti-
mate the speed of convergence, our short sample does allow us to generate 
meaningful pre-  and post- euro estimates. So quantifying any changes in the 
state of integration that have been associated with the introduction of the 
euro is not possible.20 Nevertheless, the structure of our test suggests that 
competition policy and corporate governance reforms will be needed to 
promote more banking integration. Obviously the common currency does 
bias that aﬀects the lagged dependent variable can also lead to bias in the coeﬃcient on other 
variables in the equation. Unfortunately their results suggest that the direction of the bias is 
a complicated function of several factors, which makes it diﬃcult to determine even the sign 
of the bias. We reestimated equation (2) using the second lag of ROA as an instrument for 
the lagged dependent variable. This does alter the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable 
substantially, usually making it closer to zero, but the patterns of convergence across diﬀerent 
groups of banks and across regions remain robust to this change in estimation procedure.
19. The ROA, in contrast, may be aﬀected by the degree to which banks have oﬀ- balance 
sheet operations, while ROE would not.
20. The descriptive evidence (section 6.4) shows that mean proﬁ  t rates of listed banks, and 
for savings and cooperative banks, converged somewhat across European countries since 2004. 
We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the convergence is due to reasons unrelated to 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.242        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
not directly inﬂ  uence either of these factors, so any impact of the euro would 
be through an indirect channel.
Has the euro had an eﬀect on the ease with which banks can enter markets 
across countries? At ﬁ  rst glance, it is diﬃcult to see how the euro could have 
had a ﬁ  rst-  order impact. Regulatory reform during the late 1980s and early 
1990s—and in particular the 2nd Banking Directive of 1989—permitted (in 
theory) the establishment of subsidiaries and branches of any bank residing 
in the EU in any other EU country. Legally, it eliminated any impediments 
to cross-  country banking and cross-  country establishments of branches or 
subsidiaries within the EU.
What could explain the lack of cross- border contestability in this chapter? 
Entry can take place through takeovers, the establishment of branches and 
subsidiaries, or the initiation of direct cross- border operations. In regards to 
takeovers, Köhler (2009) presents evidence that impediments seem at least, 
to some extent, to relate to nationalist motives. Köhler shows that opaque 
merger control procedures signiﬁ  cantly reduce the likelihood of foreign 
ownership of a bank, especially if this bank is large. Opaque procedures 
permit more discretion by the supervisor or other government authorities 
in blocking the acquisition of a domestic bank by a foreign bank. Promi-
nent recent examples where authorities seem to have thwarted cross-  border 
transactions include the failed takeovers of Banca Antonveneta and Banca 
Nazionale de Lavoro by foreign banks in Italy or the French reluctance to 
permit foreign bidders for Societe Generale.21 Clearly, if national authorities 
are able to block cross- border mergers, this may also prevent the market for 
corporate control from operating eﬃciently.
In terms of direct cross- border retail business, the common currency may 
have been helpful. Exchange rate risk has been eliminated and rates and 
conditions may be easier to compare across countries. Retail ﬂ  ows remain 
small (ECB 2009), however, although there is a bit of evidence of an increase 
in cross-  border retail activity in the vicinity of some borders (Fidrmuc and 
Hainz 2008). On balance, it seems that there are likely many factors that 
impede the contestability of retail banking markets in Europe.22
What about the market for corporate control? We already mentioned na-
tional objectives that may be an obstacle. There is considerable evidence 
that following the introduction of the euro money markets have become 
integrated (ECB 2009), which should have equalized the cost of funds across 
countries. Combined with the elimination of exchange rate volatility this 
should facilitate the comparability of rates of returns of banks in diﬀerent 
countries. The under-  or overperformance of a bank, therefore, can be more 
21. See Köhler (2009) for more details on these and other similar episodes involving diﬀerent 
countries in Europe.
22. It is plausible that cultural factors as in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) are impor-
tant, in particular with respect to retail banking services. However, we are not aware of system-
atic evidence on this and other factors aﬀecting cross-  border entry of markets.A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 4 3
easily compared and evaluated. In addition, deeper equity and bond markets 
permit easier ﬁ  nancing of large-  scale transactions (ECB 2009). Hence, the 
euro may have improved the corporate governance of listed banks in the 
euro area. Martynova and Renneboog (2006) ﬁ  nd that nonﬁ  nancial cross-
 border corporate takeovers did increase in the euro area more strongly than 
domestic takeovers since 1998. Ekkayokkaya, Holmes, and Paudyal (2009) 
present results that are consistent with increased cross-  border competition 
among bidders for banks in the post-  euro era. This is consistent with the 
rates of ROA convergence among EU-  listed banks that we found.
The eﬀect of increasing proﬁ  t convergence on ﬁ  nancial stability is ambig-
uous ex-  ante. The usual trade-  oﬀ between greater diversiﬁ  cation of banks’ 
portfolios (increasing ﬁ  nancial stability) and the fact that the similarity of 
the portfolios may increase overall systemic risk seems to apply (Wagner 
2009). The integration among listed banks in the EU that is suggested by our 
metric is consistent with the evidence in Gropp, Vesala, and L. Duca (2009), 
who present evidence that cross-  border contagion within Europe may have 
increased among large listed banks.
However, unlisted commercial banks, savings, and cooperative banks con-
stitute about 50 percent of total assets of the banking systems of the major 
European countries studied here and the retail market share may be even 
larger. The governance of these banks is not subject to the same mechanisms 
as the governance of listed banks. The evidence shows that they neither 
respond to competitive pressures as much as listed commercial banks, nor 
do these banks face pressure to remedy underperformance through a threat 
of takeover. These rigidities remain in place, and as far as we can see would 
be unaﬀected by the introduction of the common currency.23
6.6    Conclusion
This chapter argues that tests conducted in the previous literature for 
retail banking integration in the euro area may be misleading. The tests are 
neither necessary nor suﬃcient conditions for integration and tend to ignore 
eﬃciency and equilibrium concepts. We propose an alternative that tries to 
address these shortcomings and we argue that the convergence of the return 
on assets of banks may be a superior measure of banking integration in at 
least two dimensions. One, the return is an equilibrium concept in the sense 
that it reﬂ  ects both price and quantity eﬀects, as well as demand and supply 
aspects. Two, the test we propose also comes with natural diagnostics that 
help us interpret what might be responsible for a lack of integration.
Estimates from a partial adjustment model suggest that banking markets 
23. Hartmann et al. (2006) show that the high share of these banks may have had an adverse 
eﬀect on growth in the euro area, evidence that is consistent with the evidence presented in 
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in the United States and Europe are very diﬀerent. In the United States, 
listed and unlisted banks’ proﬁ  ts converge toward the same target level of 
proﬁ  tability. For both types of banks, if proﬁ  tability is above average it 
tends to be pushed back toward ROA∗. For unlisted U.S. banks, there is 
no evidence that underperforming banks are pushed toward an improve-
ment in their performance by a threat of a takeover. Hence, for unlisted 
commercial banks integration fails even in the United States, due to poor 
corporate control.
In Europe, only the listed banks appear to be governed by a common 
ROA∗. For unlisted banks, we observed substantial diﬀerences across Euro-
pean countries in the mean proﬁ  tability (ﬁ  gure 6.4) and we ﬁ  nd no evidence 
that unlisted commercial banks converge to a common equilibrium value. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we ﬁ  nd evidence not only for impediments 
to a properly operating market for corporate control but also evidence for 
impediments to competition. For unlisted commercial banks in Europe, 
rents do not tend to get competed away. This suggests not only impediments 
to integration across borders among unlisted commercial banks in Europe 
but also lack of integration within individual countries between listed banks 
and unlisted banks.
Our approach also highlights the importance to shift attention to mecha-
nisms that permit an eﬀective functioning of the market for corporate con-
trol and bank entry in a cross- border dimension. The chapter shows that the 
large market share of unlisted, savings, and cooperative banks may be an 
important impediment to banking integration in Europe. Our estimates also 
suggest focusing more attention on understanding the diﬀerences between 
listed and unlisted banks, and more speciﬁ  cally, seeking to understand why 
the two groups are so much more diﬀerent in Europe than in the United 
States.
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Comment  Loretta J. Mester
Reint Gropp and Anil Kashyap provide a new measure for assessing the 
degree of integration of European banking markets—in particular, retail 
banking markets. The role of integration and the best way to assess the cur-
rent state of integration is a particularly relevant question given the ten- year 
anniversary of the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the current turmoil 
taking place in ﬁ  nancial markets in which banks play a central role. They 
have produced a thought-  provoking chapter that advances the literature.
I will structure my remarks by ﬁ  rst discussing the proposed measure in the 
chapter and then talking about integration more broadly.
Europe has been working toward integrating ﬁ  nancial markets for some 
time. Dermine (2005) reviews some of the major legislative steps toward 
integration. These include the European Commission White Paper on the 
Completion of the Internal Market, published in 1985, which called for a 
single banking license; the Second Banking Directive, 1989, which allowed 
for cross- border bank branching; the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 
1992; the Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes adopted in 1994; the 
creation of a single currency, the euro, in 1999; and the Financial Services 
Action Plan of 1999, which laid out a number of initiatives to promote 
integration of banking and capital markets by 2005.
Before we can assess the beneﬁ  ts of the Gropp and Kashyap measure of 
integration over others in the literature, we need a deﬁ  nition of integration 
and a sense of what beneﬁ  ts integration is expected to provide to the econ-
omy. According to the European Central Bank (ECB), the aim of ﬁ  nancial 
integration in Europe is to increase the eﬃciency of the ﬁ  nancial system, 
increase the eﬀectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, 
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